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Abstract: Humans employ a number of strategies to improve their position in their given social
hierarchy. Overclaiming involves presenting oneself as having more knowledge than one actually
possesses, and it is typically invoked to increase one’s social standing. If increased expectations
to possess knowledge is a perceived social pressure, such expectations should increase bouts of
overclaiming. As the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is sensitive to social pressure and disruption of
the MPFC leads to decreases in overclaiming, we predicted that transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) applied to the MPFC would reduce overclaiming and the effects would be enhanced in the
presence of social pressure. Twelve participants were given a test in which half of the words were real
and half were fake, and they were asked how well they knew each word. They were not told that any
of the words were fake. Half of the participants were exposed to social pressure while the other half
were not. Following TMS delivered to the MPFC, overclaiming rates decreased, specifically under
conditions of high social pressure. Medial PFC TMS did not influence real word responses and real
words did not interact with the MPFC and social pressure. These preliminary findings support the
significant role the MPFC plays in social cognition and the importance of the MPFC in mediating
socially meaningful situations. We suggest the role of the MPFC as being highly influenced by the
premium placed on social manipulation in human evolution.
Keywords: social pressure; deception; medial prefrontal cortex; overclaiming; self-deception;
transcranial magnetic stimulation; self-enhancement; social monitoring

1. Introduction
There are numerous factors that contribute to success within a social interaction. Often examined
in social neuroscience is the influence of ego management and self-presentation [1,2]. An individual’s
ability to present oneself in a positive light has significant evolutionary benefits including, but not
limited to, reproductive potential and threat management [3]. Self-presentation is often steeped in
deception, a critical component of social communication in humans. Snyder [4] in fact described
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monitoring of the self as the process through which people regulate their own behavior in order to be
perceived in a favorable way and implicated that self-awareness had a primary basis in self-deception [5].
Overclaiming is the term often ascribed to individuals claiming to have knowledge when they
in fact do not [6]. This pretense of knowledge is thought to be one of many attributes that make up
self-enhancement which involves falsely increasing one’s statues [7]. The typical method used for
testing overclaiming is to present words that are not actual words, but adhere to typical grammatical
rules (e.g., ‘triannic’, which could be a word). When participants view these words along with actual
words, they often claim that they know them when in fact the words are fake and by definition,
unknowable. This method has been widely used [8], though there is evidence that overclaiming
measured this way may be influenced by other variables [9]. Typical deviations from Palhaus’s original
design almost always seek to increase overclaiming and include tapping into the participants’ areas of
expertise [10].
We are far from a full understanding of overclaiming. There are likely numerous fundamental
influences at play such as a memory bias in which humans often overreport familiarity with stimuli
in general and therefore may be biased to think words are known rather than not known [11].
A self-confirmation bias in terms of false memories may also be at play [12]. This is particularly true
when there is no consequence for falsely reporting knowledge [2]. It is not even known the degree to
which the phenomenon is implicit or explicit [8] as is the case with most of deception [13].
Despite the ambiguities, it is generally agreed upon, that at some level, respondents are not willing
to admit ignorance and this resistance to admit lack of knowledge stems from a desire to present
oneself favorably [14,15]. Specifically, Bradley [15] highlights that this overconfidence is especially
likely to occur in areas of perceived expertise which may be tapping into Trivers original notion
that self-deception encourages over-confidence even in the light of contradictory evidence [16,17].
Overall, most of the research on overclaiming has focused on the degree to which it represents
ego-protecting responses (such as those seen in narcissism) that are linked to overclaiming [18].
The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is a focal point of both social awareness (i.e., being aware
that other individuals are monitoring oneself) and overclaiming. The MPFC is responsible for ‘social
navigation’ and knowing and applying social ‘rules’ [19]. Moreover, while adult cases are often
highlighted, the MPFC is critical during childhood and adolescent development in terms of social
responding [20–22].
Social monitoring and social responding as well as self-awareness in the context of social
stimuli [23,24] involve MPFC circuits, though clearly other regions such as the amygdala play a
role [25]. Furthermore, patients with frontal lobe damage often present with judgment errors including
overestimating [26]. Functional neuroimaging studies have revealed that biased self-estimation is
correlated with MPFC and ventral prefrontal cortex (VPFC) activity [27].
There is evidence for a causal link between the MPFC and overclaiming. Specifically, when
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was delivered to the MPFC, bouts of overclaiming were
significantly reduced [5], which has also been observed with tDCS (transcranial direct current
stimulation [28]). Specifically, by temporarily inhibiting the MPFC with single-pulse TMS, rates of
overclaiming went down significantly compared to Sham TMS. However, social pressure was not
varied, and it is not known how increased (or decreased) social pressure would influence the MPFC’s
role in overclaiming. Recent evidence has emerged that faking both good (i.e., enhancing a person’s
status in a positive direction) and bad (i.e., intentionally exaggerating to make oneself appear more
negative) as well as responding in a socially desirable manner, are mediated via the MPFC. Furthermore,
it was reported that faking good may in fact be the default mode of the MPFC which suggests that
disruption of this region should have the most dramatic impact under conditions when one should
be under the most pressure to deceive in a favorable direction [29]. It is unknown as of now if this
relationship is causal.
Because social pressure and overclaiming appear to be mediated at least in part by networks
within the MPFC, it is reasonable to assume that MPFC disruption would have a significant influence
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on overclaiming when a person feels pressured to self-enhance. Specifically, we predicted that under
conditions of social pressure, TMS delivered to the MPFC would have a greater impact on overclaiming
than in conditions of no social pressure. Thus, we predict a greater disruption to overclaiming when
TMS is applied to the MPFC during the increased social pressure condition compared to no social
pressure condition.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twelve university students were recruited (6 males and 6 females, age 18–65; M = 20.4; SE = 1.1)
via flyer and word of mouth for the study. All participants were paid 25 dollars for their participation
and were treated in accordance with guidelines set forth by the Internal Review Board at Montclair
State University and guidelines of the American Psychological Association. All TMS was delivered
within the parameters provided by Wasserman [30]. As per local IRB guidelines, all TMS was delivered
by the PI (approved by Montclair State University IRB: IRB-16-17-424, TMS and the Self).
2.2. Materials
A Magstim, single-pulse TMS device was used for all stimulation. A 70-mm figure-of-eight coil
was used throughout the experiment. All stimuli were presented on a Dell laptop computer with a
17” display using proprietary in-house software. All triggering occurred through in-house modified
Arduino circuit boards that time-locked TMS with stimuli presentation (see below).
2.3. Stimuli
All items were drawn from the comprehensive list adopted by Paulhus et al. [6] and further
modified. The items contained words referring to historical names, events, books, fine arts, poems,
literature, authors, social science, physical science, law and popular culture. The foil words were
created to appear as if they legitimately belonged to one of these categories. As in Paulhus et al. [6] the
words were created to appear to be plausible members of the English language.
All participants were students enrolled at Montclair State University. Participants were randomly
placed into either the social pressure group or the no social pressure group (however, both groups
were equivalent in terms of sex). All participants were treated identically between the groups other
than the instructions they received concerning the test. The instructions were as follows:
No social pressure group instructions: You are going to be tested on a series of words.
These words are drawn from an advanced vocabulary list. The words have been rated extremely
difficult and all of the participants we have tested thus far have had a difficult time with this test.
Therefore, it is normal to not know many of these words. In fact, we recently ran this study with
Princeton University students and even those students did poorly. If you know the word press the ‘/’
key. If you do not know the word, press the ‘Z’ key. Speed is important, but so is accuracy. Please
note, we will not ask you what the word means. We are trusting you-if you say you know the word,
we will believe you. Likewise, if you say you do not know the word we will believe that as well.
Again, be as accurate and as fast as possible and remember, there is no pressure to do well. Do you
have any questions?
Social pressure group instructions: You are going to be tested on a series of words. These words
are drawn from a basic, simple vocabulary list. The words have been rated extremely easy and all of
the participants we have tested thus far have had an easy time with this test. Therefore, you should
know most of these words. In fact, we recently ran this study with High School students and even
those students did well. If you know the word press the ‘/’ key. If you do not know the word, press
the ‘Z’ key. Speed is important, but so is accuracy. Please note, we will not ask you what the word
means. We are trusting you-if you say you know the word, we will believe you. Likewise, if you say
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you do not know the word we will believe that as well. Again, be as accurate and as fast as possible.
Please, do your best and remember that this list is pretty easy. Do you have any questions?
These instructions were given following the Motor Threshold determination and prior to the main
experiment. Questions received were of a general nature and testing then began.
2.4. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) Procedure
Wasserman’s [30] guidelines were used to set the limits of stimulation throughout the testing
sessions. The testing was executed in two phases: motor threshold determination and the experiment
proper. Participants were initially fitted with a tight Lycra swim cap. Suprathreshold TMS pulses
were delivered to locate the region that provided the greatest MEP response to the contralateral
Abductor Pollicis Brevis (APB) muscle. The coil was relocated across the scalp until the most
responsive region was found that induced MEPs of maximal peak-to-peak amplitude. Determination
of individual MT was employed using procedures outlined by IFCN (International Federation of
Clinical Neurophysiology [31]), such that threshold was established when 50% (5 of 10) of the TMS
pulses delivered induced a measured MEP of >50 µV. All active stimulation was delivered at 90%
MT during the experiment proper. All MT measurements were made via BioPack MP150 amplifiers
and software. Once the MT intensity was determined, the cap was marked in the 10/20 International
system for EEG electrode positions.
The regions of interest were the precuneus (Pz), the MPFC and the SMA. Cortical placement was
identical to those used in similar studies [2,10]. In these previous studies, only the MPFC significantly
impacted over-claiming and self-enhancement. To determine the locations, one third of the distance,
nasion to inion, was measured for each participant. MPFC was 1.5 cm anterior to this location,
and SMA was identified as being 3 cm posterior to this location. The coil was oriented parallel to the
mid-sagittal line for all stimulation with the handle pointed in a posterior orientation (except for APB
MT determination in which the coil was held at ~45◦ from the hemispheric line). The depth of cortical
stimulation is no greater than 2 cm, ensuring that the initial effects of TMS are concentrated to the areas
of interest [30].
Baseline performance was measured by a Sham condition in which TMS stimulation was delivered
through the coil, but not to the participants’ head. During sham, the TMS coil was held at 90◦
orientation and held over Cz (standard 10/20 system coordinates). Because the regions (MPFC and
SMA) are somewhat adjacent, single-pulse TMS was employed to avoid cortical spread. The coil was
held manually [32] to ensure quick shifting of blocks as they changed approximately once per minute.
For all testing sessions, participants wore protective earplugs to prevent transient threshold shifts
caused by the acoustic artifact generated by the discharge of the TMS coil [30].
2.5. Measures of Overclaiming
The methods employed were those similar to Amati et al. [5]. The list of words (both real and fake)
was divided into 4 blocks containing 36 words per block (Table A1). For each block 50% of the words
were real terms (e.g., monochrome, zygote), and 50% were fake terms (e.g., fibia, triannic). Therefore,
TMS to each of the four brain regions was delivered during 36 word presentations. All words were
randomized, and all lists were counterbalanced across participants. The order of all brain region sites
was randomized (Appendix A). All words within a block were also randomly presented.
Participants indicated their response (yes or no) via a standard keyboard. Trials began once the
participant demonstrated comfortability with the keyboard and layout; practice trials were not given.
For all trials, TMS was delivered 300 ms after the word appeared on the screen. Response times (RT)
were measured as the amount of time after the TMS pulse.
3. Results
The overall reaction time was 406.07 ms (SE = 7.06). The average reaction time for ‘yes’ responses
(indicating the person knew the word) was 395.59 (SE = 10.87) and for no responses it was 424.67
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(SE = 6.96). This difference was found to be statistically insignificant (t(11) = 1.43, p = 0.18; Bayes
Factor = 1.9; Null vs. Alternative). In terms of overall response types, a response of ‘yes’ was indicated
63.97% of the time and a response of ‘no’ was indicated 36.03% of the time. Because half of the words
were real, a ‘perfect’ result would be 50/50. To test if there was a response bias, a chi-squared of all
the trials was conducted. It was found that there was a significant bias (X2 (1) = 103.40, p < 0.0001).
This indicated that participants felt compelled to respond ‘yes’ to knowing words.
Following up on this, we sought to determine if overclaiming occurred. The overall percentage of
‘yes’ responses to real words was 64.25% (SD = 4.59%) and the overall percentage of ‘yes’ responses to
fake words was 63.76% (SD = 3.76%). There was no difference between the word lists (real and fake) in
terms of reported knowledge (X2 (1) = 0.02, p > 0.05).
To test for reaction time differences, a 2 × 4 × 2 (response × brain region × word type) repeated
measures ANOVA was performed. It was found that there was no overall three-way interaction
(F (3,33) = 0.55, p > 0.05; BFnull = 3.5). All two-way interactions were also statistically insignificant:
response x brain region (F(3,33) = 0.336, p > 0.05; BFnull = 3.9), response x word type (F(1,11) = 0.09,
p > 0.05; BFnull = 4.4) and brain region x word type (F(3,33) = 0.18, p > 0.05; BFnull = 4.2). There was no
significant main effect for response (F(1,11) = 1.52, p > 0.05; BFnull = 2.3) or word type (F(1,11) = 0.33,
p > 0.05; BFnull = 3.9). There was a significant main effect for brain region (F(3,33) = 3.19, p < 0.04;
BFnull = 1.2). Post hoc LSD tests revealed that the reaction time during MPFC TMS was significantly
longer (M = 443.12, SE = 9.53) than sham (M = 386.63, SE = 15.78, p > 0.05) and PZ (M = 395.91,
SE = 9.53, p > 0.04). This result indicated that responses were delayed when the MPFC was disrupted.
In terms of responses, a similar analysis was performed. Since no/yes responses are directly
related, only yes responses were analyzed in a 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA (word type x brain
region). It was found that there was no interaction (F(3,33) = 0.28, p > 0.05; BFnull = 4.0). There was
also no main effect for word type (F(1,11) = 1.87, p > 0.05; BFnull = 1.9). There was a main effect
for brain region (F(3,33) = 6.04, p > 0.002; BFalternative = 2.1). The only differences were found when
Sham (M = 10.0, SE = 0.33) was compared to all other groups: MPFC (M = 7.88, SE = 0.42, p < 0.007),
PZ (M = 8.80, SE = 0.30, p < 0.005) and SMA (M = 8.63, SE = 0.32, p < 0.02).
To test the main hypotheses surrounding social pressure, a 2 × 2 × 4 (social pressure × word
type × brain region) mixed ANOVA was run in terms of the number of ‘yes’ responses. A significant
three-way interaction was found (F(1,30) = 3.11, p < 0.04; BFnull = 1.2). To determine the precise
nature of this interaction, we examined real and fake words independently. It was found that there
was no interaction (social pressure x brain region) for real words (F(3,30) = 0.72, p > 0.05; BFnull
= 3.2). However, for fake words, there was a significant social pressure x brain region interaction
(F(3,30) = 4.77, p < 0.008 BFalternative = 3.8). This suggested that social pressure interacted uniquely
with brain areas for overclaiming. In the Sham condition, when social pressure was applied, people
tended to ‘know’ fake words more (t(11) = 2.74, p < 0.02; BFalternative = 3.1). This demonstrated a
baseline influence of social pressure. TMS delivered to PZ resulted in a similar significant difference
between the social (M = 11.0, SE = 0.68) and non-social groups (M = 9.0, SE = 0.26, t(11) = 2.61,
p < 0.03; BFalternative = 2.6). That difference disappeared when the SMA was disrupted (t(11) = −0.18,
p > 0.05 BFnull = 4.5). Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation did the opposite when applied to the MPFC:
The participants were less likely to overclaim in the social condition (M = 6.33, SE = 0.62) when
compared to the non-social condition (M = 8.50, SE = 0.67, t(11) = 2.38, p < 0.04; BFalternative = 1.9;
Figure 1).
We also analyzed these data in terms of reaction time. Employing a 2 × 2 × 2 × 4 (social pressure
× word type × response × brain region) mixed ANOVA, it was found that there were no significant
differences (all p’s > 0.05). The only trend observed across all interactions and main effects was the social
pressure × response interaction (p = 0.06). For the non-social pressure group, there was no difference
between the ‘no’ response (M = 395.61, SE = 20.13) and the ‘yes’ response (M = 407.60, SE = 12.41;
(t(5) = −0.41, p > 0.05: BFnull = 4.2). There was a difference between ‘no’ response (M = 442.61,
SE = 9.80) and the ‘yes’ response (M = 381.19, SE = 12.55; t(5) = 3.25, p < 0.02; BFalternative = 6.6) for the
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social pressure group. This interaction indicated that when pressured socially, it took additional time
to respond ‘no’. Caution is urged in any interpretation of this finding as the omnibus test was only
aBrain
trend.
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is not different between fake and real words, which results in a significant amount of false positives
[5]. Similar to Palhaus’s findings [33,34], we conclude that faking knowledge is socially mediated
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the MPFC has an influence on false responding. Because TMS had an influence on fake words, but not
real words, we speculate that disruption of the MPFC is not uniform in its cognitive influence. It is
not known why such a difference exists proximately as it could be any number of different factors
(e.g., cognitive load, unfamiliarity, anxiety, etc.). However, as a preliminary finding, we assume that
these data suggest that false reporting involves unique structures of the brain though this is highly
speculative [38].
Other social pressures need to be applied to test the generalizability of our findings as do
participant expectations [42]. For example, our instructions invoked a social pressure given by one
individual (i.e., the experimenter) which may differ from group pressure or pressure given by an
intimate other. While significant evidence exists that the MPFC would respond similarly, we do not
know that to be the case. While overclaiming was chosen as a measure of self-enhancement, we also
do not know if all cases of self-enhancement (e.g., over-evaluating one’s driving ability) would be
influenced similarly. Further testing needs to be done before it is known if all cases of social pressure
influence all cases of self-enhancement. While we do not know the outcomes, we will speculate that
social pressures with more serious evolutionary outcomes than faking word knowledge (e.g., pressure
with direct reproductive consequences) would be even more influenced by MPFC disruption.
Caveats
We consider these data preliminary as the sample size was low (n = 6 per group). These data
should be replicated in a larger sample. We also consider these data preliminary due to an overall
lack of literature concerning the role overclaiming has in neuroscience and cognition in general [43].
Not being able to answer if the individual truly believes their response (or if they are ignorant that they
are falsely responding) is problematic. While this harkens to the debates of the definition of the term
‘self-deception’ itself and remains beyond the scope of this study, it is important to acknowledge that
overclaiming as a dependent variable still needs investigation from a purely psychological perspective.
We believe that neuroimaging may be of some help in detangling if participants are aware of their false
claiming. We further consider these data preliminary as the sample size was low. These data should be
replicated in a larger sample.
In conclusion, we report that the MPFC plays a large role in navigating the social world. Social
pressure was found to influence false knowledge such that TMS stimulation applied to MPFC resulted
in less over-claiming. These data indicated that the MPFC is involved in the interpretation of social
pressure and suggestive of the importance the MPFC may play in evaluating social pressure to ‘be
smart’ or ‘know it all’. While preliminary, these data are consistent with other research detailing
overclaiming being tied to the MPFC.
Author Contributions: All authors were involved in the design and conceptualization of the study. B.T.-L., V.K.,
M.C. were the main writers of the manuscript. V.K., M.E.F., J.O., and A.J. assisted in experimental setup and
writing. M.C. and A.D. assisted in running participants. J.P.K. applied all TMS, provided editing and writing.
All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A
Order of random brain site stimulation by participant (#): a = Sham; b = MPFC, c = SMA, d = PZ
1acdb, 2bdca, 3bacd, 4dcab, 5adcb, 6dabc, 7bdac, 8cbad, 9bdca, 10cadb, 11abdc, 12dbca
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Table A1. List of words used in the experiment.
Real Words

Fake Words

Lepidoptery
Follicle
Burette
Lobotomy
Cognizant
Entomology
Allele
Amorphous
Polymerization
Scalar
Zygote
Viscosity
Quark
Artery
Dogmatic
Exocytosis
Morass
Opulent
Tribulation
Insipid
Supercilious
Laud
Xenophobia
Omnipotent
Unequivocal
Abdicate
Flagellum
Extravagant
Iridescent
Disgruntled
Colloquial
Perpetuity
Zygomaticus
Foment
Rhizome
Nazca lines
Intrinsic
Homo erectus
Unscrupulous
Soliloquy
Justification
The Defenestration of Prague
Indefinite
Clairvoyant
Auspicious
Trivial
Maleficent
Fission
Inclement
Aglet
Umlaut
Latus rectum
Paraben
Palm frond
Turpentine

Midfloral
Vorax
Midternal
Perchery
Dex
Inosmosis
Tribution
Prevoid
Suffaltible
Halible
Formatic
Eratifinatic
Ellictitive
Myric
Nampercilious
Precilious
Exultion
Tibula
Saprocy
Sepititious
Oblongular
Rancidious
Geolithic
Trisectomy
Recticious
Gruffle
Plumistic
Berythium
Allurium
Florabane
Eloquacious
Oblivia
Prevoid
Catosynthesis
Midternal
Bellignorant
Promedic
Bluther
Lchistamine
Reccentric
Geomorphile
Paradign
Accentrax
Paradocial
Prerecuite
Morphinil
Yusteric
Protrake
Gauderate
Quartom
Polycerics
Dright
Hapsate
Carcolepsy
Jentacular
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Table A1. Cont.
Real Words

Fake Words

Philtrum
Uvula
Cornichon
Directrix
Occipital
Duodenum
Clad
Dwell
Impel
Accede
Rebuke
Cede
Facile
Entreat
Earnest
Exalt
Ensue

Ternal
Mimsy
Gleek
Glumium
Skoch
Flubium
Bleeale
Tongressiant
Lymispre
Guniquated
Agnosary
Esagnacious
Nuwmerts
Craderdon
Invinceclace
Logistorgian
Greepaling
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